1) Agree with Steinbaum to “open a second front” on antitrust concerns over the current implementation of the contractor relationship. Like some sort of legal judo move, this would use a supposed strength of the companies against them.
Although if the case were brought against them, gig companies might respond by lobbying congress to simply create a new “dependent contractor” type classification, which sanctions some control over workers but more flexibility than your average wage employee. Precedents for this type of classification exist in other countries like Canada and Italy. So you may still end up in a situation where you have this tug of war with gig companies over this new classification and what benefits are included. (More context on dependent contractors: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1963&context=aulr)
2) I think the contractor vs employee debate does obscure a pretty important fact: most worker rights are just guaranteed to W-2 employees. This made sense when people worked with a single employer their whole career, and the government could ask companies to pay for certain worker benefits (e.g. health care, unemployment insurance) on its behalf. But this employment-focused policy seems not to have aged well. People switch companies every few years and have to re-enroll in their benefits whenever this happens, which is an expensive, time intensive, and frustrating experience for everyone.
I’d suggest opening a “third front” on expanding coverage of these employment benefits to all workers. Universal healthcare is already gaining traction at the state and national level. But what about universal workers’ comp, or unemployment insurance? I’d say these are extremely worthwhile efforts as well, and would also go a long way to help other at-risk workers (domestic, farm workers not covered by many employee statutes).
The points made by Professor Steinbaum opened my thinking on the potential litigation risk facing many two-sided platform companies, those who can control aggregated supplier pricing or discipline aggregated supplier pricing offered by a large group of unorganized suppliers, drivers in the case of Uber.
Amazon, as a dominate vertical platform in the US, seems to face a similar risk; they have powerful influence on pricing in product categories where Amazon is a supplier alongside aggregated upstream suppliers.
Amazon can discipline suppliers who go below pricing levels established by Amazon's own products. Amazon has the ability to strongly promote Amazon's products if a buyer is considering a product from competitive supplier. Amazon can exercise even more powerful pricing control by suppressing, or handicapping, search results from supplier products priced below Amazon's own products. Over time, Amazon would have the power raise the lowest product pricing levels above a 'free' market balance, causing consumer harm and strengthening a case for monopoly litigation.
1) Agree with Steinbaum to “open a second front” on antitrust concerns over the current implementation of the contractor relationship. Like some sort of legal judo move, this would use a supposed strength of the companies against them.
Although if the case were brought against them, gig companies might respond by lobbying congress to simply create a new “dependent contractor” type classification, which sanctions some control over workers but more flexibility than your average wage employee. Precedents for this type of classification exist in other countries like Canada and Italy. So you may still end up in a situation where you have this tug of war with gig companies over this new classification and what benefits are included. (More context on dependent contractors: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1963&context=aulr)
2) I think the contractor vs employee debate does obscure a pretty important fact: most worker rights are just guaranteed to W-2 employees. This made sense when people worked with a single employer their whole career, and the government could ask companies to pay for certain worker benefits (e.g. health care, unemployment insurance) on its behalf. But this employment-focused policy seems not to have aged well. People switch companies every few years and have to re-enroll in their benefits whenever this happens, which is an expensive, time intensive, and frustrating experience for everyone.
I’d suggest opening a “third front” on expanding coverage of these employment benefits to all workers. Universal healthcare is already gaining traction at the state and national level. But what about universal workers’ comp, or unemployment insurance? I’d say these are extremely worthwhile efforts as well, and would also go a long way to help other at-risk workers (domestic, farm workers not covered by many employee statutes).
Very interesting interview. Thank you.
The points made by Professor Steinbaum opened my thinking on the potential litigation risk facing many two-sided platform companies, those who can control aggregated supplier pricing or discipline aggregated supplier pricing offered by a large group of unorganized suppliers, drivers in the case of Uber.
Amazon, as a dominate vertical platform in the US, seems to face a similar risk; they have powerful influence on pricing in product categories where Amazon is a supplier alongside aggregated upstream suppliers.
Amazon can discipline suppliers who go below pricing levels established by Amazon's own products. Amazon has the ability to strongly promote Amazon's products if a buyer is considering a product from competitive supplier. Amazon can exercise even more powerful pricing control by suppressing, or handicapping, search results from supplier products priced below Amazon's own products. Over time, Amazon would have the power raise the lowest product pricing levels above a 'free' market balance, causing consumer harm and strengthening a case for monopoly litigation.
Great points re: Amazon. You might be interested in Lina Khan's definitive piece on the antitrust case against Amazon (and she's now chair of the FTC!): https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/e.710.Khan.805_zuvfyyeh.pdf